Integrated Policies for an Agricultural Revolution in the Sahel

Here's a link to a paper I wrote a few months ago for a policy competition. I wrote it while I was reading "A History of World Agriculture" by Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart. This is an excellent book on the evolution of agricultural systems, mainly focusing on the Western world. Anyway, when I wrote the policy paper I was very much under the influence of this book and its macro-scale vision of agricultural change over large areas and long time periods. Looking at it again now, I see that my paper has a very technocratic, top-down vision. This is understandable, as it is a presentation of general ideas and guidelines for national- and regional-level agrarian policy. However, I sort of cringe to see that my proposals are not too different from those advanced by the corporate-driven AGRA, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, which seems to prioritize increasing the sales of African and international agricultural input suppliers as much as it aims for poverty reduction in Africa.

In my paper, I don't talk about addressing land inequalities, preserving or respecting long-standing traditions or minor crops, looking at women's special role in Sahelian farming, etc. In short, I gloss over all the details and differences that make a place what it is, in my rush to propose wide-reaching, universal actions. I hope to redress these shortcomings of the paper in a new proposal that I've been thinking about for a long time. This proposal will also lay out a more detailed vision of how my large-scale policy outlines can be implemented on the ground, responding to diverse local realities. So anyway, for my audience of two readers or so, the forthcoming new Sahel proposal is something to look forward to.

Beverly Bell article on Country Hospitality

Here's a link to a very good article by Beverly Bell, author of Walking on Fire about Haitian women and their struggles. Beverly is currently in Haiti, writing very good, insightful articles on the situation after the earthquake. I have been trying to get in touch with the peasant organizations she mentions that are working to take in quake refugees and planning for future agrarian development. I have had little response to my proposal for agrarian development in Haiti, which is frustrating, because it seems that thinking people inside and outside of Haiti are clamoring for just such a plan.

Food shouldn't be big

Here's an article my cousin sent me today from the New York Times. It's about bribery in the food industry, in this case involving Kraft Foods in my home state. For me the point isn't the handful of baddies that were involved in this particular scandal, but rather the fact that having the food of hundreds of millions of people controlled in large part by a few mammoth companies just doesn't make sense. Of course with oligopolies you open the door to corruption and other immoral practices, and the size of huge food conglomerates means that any such practices will affect millions of people. But beyond illegal hijinks, which can be said to be anomalies, the system is inherently flawed. Any decision, even presumably honest, responsible decisions, will affect the same millions of people. Any contamination or disease outbreak will affect these millions. Industrial sabotage, terrorism, logistical problems, decisions as to product lineup--if inordinate power and market control is in a few hands, all of these normal events in the day-to-day existence of a business will affect an abnormally large amount of people. It's arguable that big isn't good in any business--the lethargy and clumsiness of bloated organizations get in the way of effective operations. But for food, this clumsiness of size is not only more acute (because the option for smaller, more nimble, more diverse producers and providers is much more real and natural), but it becomes a moral issue that affects us all. If my Hanes briefs or my new television aren't made as cheaply or as efficiently as they might be, it's not a big deal. I don't have to buy new ones every day, and I've got some room for maneuvering as to when I use and replace the product. But food is something essential, necessary every day. If corporate inefficiency affects the food I eat, that is a truly grave moral issue.


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/business/25tomatoes.html

Cooperative Sweatshops for Haiti!

Many commentators on Haiti, from Bill Clinton to Paul Collier to Ban Ki-Moon, have been forcefully advocating the proliferation of garment factories as a key to Haiti's economic development. Even the US government, in an attempt to aid the people of Haiti, has decreed itself tariff-free for garments made in Haiti for the next 10 years. To many people this garment factory model of economic development makes intuitive sense—if the Haitian economy is poor and largely based on a backwards agricultural sector, then creating a bunch of new factories is just the ticket. However, there are a few logical flaws in this line of thinking.

The most important flaw inherent in the Clinton model of sweatshop-led development is that it is founded on low wages, so it can never end poverty in Haiti. Boosters of this model claim that the low wages of Haitian workers represent an absolute advantage that favors profitability of garment factories. This shows the tunnel-vision nature of the proposal. It's true that Haitians receive low wages, and it's true that factory owners can profit greatly from this. However, it would be impossible for the country of Haiti to enjoy a generalized economic prosperity from such a model. If attracting and maintaining investment were based on keeping wages low, then there is no way that the proliferation of these factories could ever benefit workers. If, on the other hand, workers were to organize and demand higher wages, factory owners would either have to repress these demands, or move their investments elsewhere, because the low-wage attractiveness of Haiti would be no longer. So whether the garment factories prospered (due to maintaining Haitian misery) or floundered (due to Haitians' demanding better pay), the model is inviable in the long-run. Those who draw comparisons to the US's 19^th and 20^th century economic development, driven in part by garment sweatshops, are misled at best and willingly misleading at worst. They should know that the benefits that accrued to garment workers during this historical process came about thanks to labor organizing, and this organizing was only effective because the industries operating in the US couldn't simply relocate their factories to other countries at the first sign of labor unrest, as is possible and common today.

Another, seemingly more agrarian proposal from Bill Clinton and his friends is promoting export agriculture based on things like mangos or coffee. Again, this is erroneous thinking, like the promotion of sweatshops. Exported crops have numerous ecological and economic arguments against them.

Most obvious in the ecological sphere is that when you take away large amounts of fruits or grains from the land it was grown on, you're also taking away the nutrients the plant drew from the soil to produce them. If the product goes to a nearby town or is consumed on the farm, it's possible that part of those nutrients will return to the local soil in the form of discarded peelings, raw human shit, or processed sewage sludge. If, however, the product of the earth is shipped to a distant country, those nutrients are gone for good. To replace them you've got to add synthetic fertilizers. Another ecological strike against export crops is that they are usually grown as monocultures, meaning that a field is dedicated only to that crop. This makes that field a breeding grounds for any insects or diseases that attack that particular crop, which means that farmers must use large amounts of pesticides to control these problems.

The issues of synthetic fertilizer use and pesticide use brings us to the economic drawbacks of export crops. An export-driven farm must rely heavily on purchased inputs to maintain soil fertility and prevent pest problems. These inputs represent a cost that cuts into profitability. Aside from this and more importantly, dedicating a field to one crop gives far less net production and profit than planting it to a mix of crops. For instance, if instead of planting a field only to corn I plant it to a mix of corn and beans, I won't get as much corn or as many beans as if I'd dedicated the field exclusively to one or the other. But I will get a good deal more than if I'd planted half the field only to beans, and half only to corn. This is because multiple crops complement one another. If this is the case with our simple example of only two crops, imagine the productivity of a typical Haitian garden plot with 5 or more crops planted together. All this is to say that an acre planted by a typical Haitian peasant, using few purchased inputs, has a higher net productivity, both in terms of food produced and in terms of net profit, than an acre of monocrop plantation, be it mangos, coffee, coconuts, or oil palm. In fact, plantation farming anywhere in the world has always had such a dismal productivity per acre compared to normal, smallholder farms, that it has only been viable where owners save money by paying meager wages to workers or by being irresponsible with natural resources.

This brings us back to a problem shared by proposals for both sweatshop-driven development and export agriculture-driven development. It only makes sense to those of us who think of farming as backwards and a poor creator of wealth. We have seen in the prior paragraph that peasant agriculture is in fact a better creator of wealth per acre than is plantation agriculture. It is also a better creator of wealth per person, though it may not seem so at first. Plantation agriculture, with many acres controlled by one owner (or a consortium of shareholders) can ostensibly create much wealth for the owners. But its profitability, like that of sweatshops, is predicated on low wages for the people that work in the enterprise. A plantation produces a cash income for owners, but this is at the expense of workers (who consequently have little incentive to pursue maximum productivity, either of land or of work). This means that in the end, plantations are actually poor creators of wealth, but very good upward redistributors of the little wealth created. On the other hand, peasant agriculture, where farmers are owners and workers on their own land, leads to a maximum production by each farmer, of which he gets to keep the entirety. To put it in concrete terms, a 100-acre plantation with a few employees can provide starvation wages for those employees and luxurious wealth for one person, while those 100 acres divided between 100 people could provide a decent livelihood for each one, and certainly a much higher total production than the plantation.

Why then is Haitian agriculture so consistently disparaged if, as I claim, the value represented in Haiti's agricultural sector is immense? Almost all the food produced is either consumed by farmers and their neighbors, or sold to residents of Port-au-Prince with few middlemen. In both cases, it's very possible that the wealth created by growing food is not well-accounted for in official balance sheets representing the gross domestic product of Haiti, because auto-consumption involves no monetary transaction, and informal market channels are often not seen by economists and statisticians. But even though auto-consumption or short-path marketing does not involve large flows of cash, it represents a lot of value. When you consume your own produce, the value of that produce to you is essentially the retail price, because that is what you are saving by producing your own food instead of buying it at the market. Even if a farmer sells his produce to a market woman to sell in the village or in Port-au-Prince, the fact that this market woman is likely the only middleman means that the price the farmer receives is relatively high. Compare this to US farmers (or tropical farmers growing export crops), who are paid mere cents for every dollar the consumer spends.

I have just made the case for promoting peasant agriculture in Haiti as opposed to plantation agriculture. In other essays I have argued in favor of further favoring productivity of peasant agriculture in Haiti by providing small farmers with better access to land, credit, tools, and inputs. But what would be the equivalent of a “peasant sweatshop”? Is it possible to harness the garment factories' admitted potential for wealth creation, in such a way that that wealth reaches workers and thus favors a general, widespread economic advancement in Haiti?

I believe so, and this argument is the ultimate reason that I am writing this post. I believe that sweatshops can potentially play a valuable role in Haiti's development, if and only if they are cooperative sweatshops. That is to say that they would not in fact be sweatshops, but garment factories owned by their very workers, and hence preserving for them a level of dignity impossible to attain in a factory owned by a profiteer foreigner. But beyond working conditions, which would surely be better in such employee-owned factories, the main difference would be that the wealth generated by such an enterprise would accrue directly to the workers, instead of leaving the country or flowing to Haitian elites. Profits would be invested in other productive or socially responsible projects, and the higher wages workers would pay themselves would go to buy goods and services from other working Haitians.

I have read that a Haitian sweatshop laborer earning $3US a day produces suits that can sell in the US for $550. Now I imagine that no one worker actually makes an entire suit in a day, but rather hundreds of sleeves, or lapels, or sews on hundreds of buttons, all in an integrated assembly line. But even if we suppose that a garment factory turns out the modest average of one of these suits per worker per day, it is easy to see the profit potential that so attracts Bill Clinton and the investors he courts for Haiti. A few dollars in labor, plus a few dollars in materials, and a few dollars in shipping, and you've got a product that must sell for at least a hundred dollars wholesale. I've heard of return on capital of 22%! If workers were in charge of a factory, this math wouldn't change much, except maybe instead of $3 a day they'd earn $10US. The factory would take a little hit on the profit margin, but they'd be their own shareholders, so it wouldn't matter! If times got tough, or prices went down, the workers could decide how to weather it, and would in fact be more able to resist adverse economic circumstances than outside investors looking to maintain a certain return on their investment.

So what are the practical steps to make such a dream a reality? I should think the first would be to obtain some seed money, from interested investors or a grant in some change the world contest. This money could then be leveraged with credit from Haitian banks, the Inter-American Development Bank, or other such large, institutional investors. One would then buy a factory, gather together a group of workers (preferably working in collaboration with an existing grassroots group, like a peasant association or worker union), and set to work running the factory. This would include creating the workflow plan of the factory, lining up suppliers, and most importantly courting buyers, preferably high-end fashion retailers whose tariff savings would be more significant if their luxury clothing were coming to them from Haiti as opposed to another country without special tariff treatment in the US. Over the course of a few years the factory would pay off any loans from banks or private investors, and then the operation would truly belong to the workers. In time they could expand vertically, producing first the fabric they assemble into clothes, then spinning the thread used to weave this fabric, and finally buying and ginning cotton directly from Haitian producers. It would be an engine of integrated local development.

This idea should attract support from all political sectors. It is libertarian and pro-market in its contention that free enterprise can benefit people and that credit and opportunities for risk-taking should be available to everyone, not just to economic and political elites with inordinate amounts of influence. It is progressive and pro-worker in promoting a more even distribution of wealth and generalized economic development for a poor country. It follows the lines of Clinton's proposals for Haiti to a letter, taking their spirit even further. The only people who would object to such an idea would be current sweatshop owners who might see their profit margin threatened by emboldened workers demanding a more just wage. But even these could be won over. Many sweatshop owners are Haitians themselves, and recognize (more now than ever) that their personal well-being is impacted by the generalized poverty of their country. While profit is surely important to such Haitian elites, also important is the development of their country and the dignity of their countrymen (as well as the purchasing power of these countrymen!). Surely they would be willing to raise wages slightly if it meant sustainable profits for them and a better life for their country. As for foreign sweatshop owners, I don't see any silver lining to my proposal. It would cut into their all-important profit margin if it incited their workers to demand better wages. But given the time frame that would be necessary to make my idea a reality and eventually a major social force, and the mere 10-year window of special US tariff treatment of Haitian garments, many foreign investors will likely be gone from Haiti before a worker cooperative garment factory would have time to affect them significantly.

I want to close by stressing once again the impossibility of any model for economic development based on low wages, outside capital, and concentration of wealth. I know that Bill Clinton's sweatshop chorus will remain an important voice in the discussions of Haiti's future development, and I accept that foreign- and elite-owned sweatshops will be part of Haiti's future, as they are part of its present. In fact, I have no grand moral problem with these sweatshops. Presumably their owners are unpleasant, exploitative people, but I agree with their basic argument that people accept what they pay because there are no better options. In the face of a total lack of government and donor support for peasant agriculture and small businesses, some desperate people will of course take low-wage jobs at sweatshops, and presumably these people take the jobs because they have no better alternatives and welcome the $3US a day they can get there. But if we can change the paradigm such that not only Haitian agriculture (see my posts on Haitian agrarian reform) but also Haitian industry is more capable of providing a dignified livelihood to people, people will no longer have to make this horrid choice between pauperdom or working in sweatshops. As with the much-vaunted public health care option in the US that would ostensibly force private insurers to play fair, providing a better, more just form of worker-owned garment factory in Haiti will force even private sweatshop investors to give their workers a better deal.

My idea for Haiti

So the three posts you'll see below are versions in English, Spanish, and Haitian Kreyol of a plan I wrote on January 20th of this year. It proposes a response to the tragedy of the Haitian earthquake, based on strengthening the agrarian foundations of Haiti's economy. I welcome any comments or offers of collaboration to make such a plan a reality.

A Haitian economic recovery based on migration of urban earthquake victims to rural areas

Background and summary

Many victims of the recent earthquake in Haiti are migrating from Port au Prince and other earthquake-affected cities to their ancestral villages in the countryside. Such a migration provides victims with a supportive family environment as they rebuild their lives, as well as lessening the need for costly urban rebuilding projects and massive relocation camps. With this in mind, part of the institutional and NGO resources for the short- and long-term Haitian recovery effort should be dedicated to supporting this migration to the countryside. This support would consist in:

• Linking rural peasant groups and rural families with grassroots collectives and individuals in earthquake-affected urban areas and displaced persons camps

• Rewarding villages that receive earthquake refugees, through investment in village and household infrastructure

• Promoting economic self-sufficiency of relocated earthquake victims, through land, grants, and loans for housebuilding and agricultural activities

Such a project would entail a collaboration between local and national Haitian governments (for general coordination and certain infrastructure investments), Haitian microcredit and commercial banks, foreign NGOs and development agencies (for grants and other infrastructure investments), and Haitian individuals and communities, which would host displaced people and donate land for their new farms. Most important are the displaced earthquake victims themselves, who would play the principal role in the reestablishment of their own economic self-sufficiency.

This project would help to reverse a decades-long trend of mass exodus of people from rural zones to precarious shantytowns in the capital. The end result would be a great strengthening of Haiti's economic base, a revitalization of the countryside, and a less-crowded, better-planned Port au Prince.

Detailed description of the project

• Villages (represented by municipal government, peasant groups, churches, etc.) will accept displaced families from Port au Prince and other earthquake-stricken areas. The village will cede unused communal land to these families (half a hectare per family), and everyone in the village will collaborate in field days to rehabilitate the land on these parcels (digging erosion-control ditches, planting lines of soil-retaining plants and trees, etc.). Normally this unused land has been abandoned because it's been so badly degraded. Giving it to a family for them to tend and to earn their livelihood from the land is a way to ensure it will spring back to life, but it first must receive intensive, village-wide attention to make it usable. The land rehabilitation process can be overseen by Haitian agronomists, and if needed agronomists from other countries and NGOs can offer their services as well. For example, Cuba has a long experience of “loaning” agronomy experts to remote Haitian villages.

• In return for its collaboration in ceding and reconditioning land for earthquake victims, the village will receive a suite of infrastructure and collective-good interventions implemented by NGOs and the Haitian government. Such interventions might include drilling public wells for potable water, building or improving the village school, or putting in public latrines. It would also be desirable to enlist the help of Columbia University's Earth Institute and its Millenium Villages project. They can provide their proven suite of road improvement, a communal truck for village needs, agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, medical care, treated bednets, etc.

• If they have not participated in the suite of more or less standardized interventions listed above, Haitian national and local governments can implement a village-decided priority project such as a library or a soccer field. It is important to reinforce people's trust and interaction with their government.

• The eventual goal is for earthquake survivors to build their own houses on the land ceded them by the village. However, as this house goes up, various family house compounds in the village will each accept a family of earthquake survivors. The survivor family will be integrated into the household of the receiving family (preferably relatives of the survivors).

• In return for this contribution to the wellbeing of earthquake victims, compounds that host victims will receive an earthquake- and hurricane-proofing assessment and rehabilitation of their house, plus a latrine, and a $500US loan from a microcredit bank for an agricultural project. The earthquake-proofing assessment of host houses can be initially provided by teams of construction experts from Colombia. Due to a severe earthquake in 1999 in west-central Colombia, the country possesses many engineers with experience in post-earthquake scenarios and constructing seismo-resistant houses from cheap, local materials like bamboo. Latrines can be built by an NGO specializing in sanitation. Microcredit loans can come from Fonkoze, Haiti's most important microcredit bank. There would have to be some sort of government guarantee on loans. Fonkoze, like many other developing-country microcredit banks, traditionally focuses on short-term, small-amount loans for commercial enterprises like selling packaged food. It would need some extra support to be able to assume the risk inherent in larger, agricultural loans.

• Displaced families will receive a grant and in-kind help to construct their new houses. Natural, locally-available materials will be given priority, and of course houses will follow seismo- and hurricane-resistant designs. Large donor agencies and the Haitian government can provide housing grants, and Habitat for Humanity and Colombian seismo-resistant construction experts can provide direct aid in designing and building the house.

• Displaced families will also receive a $500US agricultural loan. Such loans will be issued to groups of six families, with each family receiving $500US. The group should consist of three displaced families, and three host families from the village. First the three displaced families of the group will receive their loans, with an interest-free grace period of six months. After six months of their dutiful reimbursement (that is, a year after the initial disbursement of the loan), the other three families will receive their loans, with the same 6-month interest-free grace period. This encourages all parties to collaborate, because everyone's credit is dependent on everyone else's repayment behavior. Loan recipients should be women, because they historically have better repayment rates than men, and focusing the loan on them improves their economic position in the family. Loans will be used to purchase inputs and equipment for a diversified agricultural plan drafted by the borrower, in collaboration with an agronomist (preferably Haitian) who will assess the proposal's ecological and economic viability. On top of this loan, each displaced family (but not host families) will receive donated livestock (possibly from Heifer International) such as pigs, goats, and chickens, which provide nutritious products the family can consume or sell, and which simultaneously improve soil fertility with their manure. Seeds for agricultural projects can come in grant form from the CGIAR centers, which are known for their crop varieties that perform well under difficult environmental conditions.

• Necessary contacts to implement this project are obviously wide-reaching. Initial rural Haitian partners can be peasant associations such as those in the villages of Papaye and Fondwa. The identification and selection of urban earthquake victims looking to relocate can be coordinated with neighborhood groups like that in Bel Air, Port au Prince, and with civic groups that arise in displaced persons camps. I have mentioned some possible international NGO collaborators, though if the project were expanded to many villages it would be preferable that these NGOs find or train local Haitians to do the work of well-digging, house assessment, agronomy advice, etc. There are already large numbers of urban earthquake victims now living in rural areas, which makes the project even easier to execute because it is already started. Ideally it would be possible to confirm that all people benefiting from such a project of supported relocation really are earthquake victims. This might be done through a centralized registry of victims (if such a registry is set up by the government or the UN in the future), or by checking Haitian ID cards or other documents to establish prior residence in Port au Prince or other affected cities.

• This project of supported migration of earthquake victims could be first tested in a small rural communal section of 8000 people or so. If such a zone received 500 families (about 2000 people) from Port au Prince, that would increase local population by about 25%, from 8000 to 10000. A generous cost estimate of such a project would be $5000US per displaced family, spread across NGOs, Haitian government, and international donors. It is important to remember that this cost would be to relocate a family, ensure its economic livelihood, and improve the housing, sanitation, and economic livelihood of those compounds temporarily hosting displaced families, as well as the hosting village in general. Hence it would cost $2.5M US to relocate about 2000 people and radically improve life for 8000 more rural people, many of them also recovering from some degree of earthquake damage. A basis for comparison is Habitat for Humanity's estimate that merely constructing temporary shelters would cost about $2500US per family. Considering all this, the cost of our proposal is modest.

• If the pilot project were successful in one village, it could be scaled up to others to become a nationwide program. Repeating this process of supported migration in 250 villages would relocate about a quarter of Port au Prince's pre-earthquake population, would cost $500M US, and would bring development and infrastructure to almost half of the rural communities in Haiti. This would effectively complement what is sure to be a massive reconstruction and aid effort for those people remaining in Port au Prince. Our project would alleviate some of the city's population pressure, and create an economically revitalized countryside that can serve as both supplier and buyer of goods and services in the capital. The net effect would be a harmonization of the relationship between the capital and the provinces, and a nationwide economic growth based on solid agrarian fundamentals. All for what will surely be a fraction of the price of the rest of the humanitarian response in Haiti.

Una recuperación económica en Haití, basada en la migración de víctimas urbanas del terremoto a zonas rurales

Contexto y resumen

Muchas víctimas del terremoto reciente en Haití están migrando de Puerto Príncipe y otras ciudades destruidas a sus pueblos natales en el campo. Esta migración provee a las víctimas un ambiente familiar de apoyo mientras reconstruyen sus vidas, además de disminuir la necesidad de proyectos costosos como reconstrucción urbana y grandes campamentos de personas desplazadas. Teniendo esto en cuenta, es preciso dedicar una parte de los recursos institucionales y de ONGs para apoyar esta migración al campo. Este apoyo consistiría en:

• Vincular a las asociaciones de campesinos y familias rurales con grupos de base y personas en áreas urbanas afectadas por el terremoto, y en campamentos de personas desplazadas

• Recompensar a los pueblos que reciban refugiados del terremoto, a través de inversiones en infraestructura del pueblo y de hogares

• Promover la autosuficiencia económica de las víctimas reubicadas, a través de tierra, subvenciones, y préstamos para construir sus casas y emprender actividades agrícolas

Esta propuesta implica una colaboración entre los gobiernos haitianos locales y nacional (para coordinación general y ciertas inversiones de infraestructura), bancos haitianos comerciales y de microcrédito, agencias de desarrollo y ONGs extranjeras (para subvenciones y otras inversiones de infraestructura), e individuos y comunidades haitianos, quienes recibirán personas desplazadas y donarán tierra para sus nuevas fincas. Los actores más importantes serán las víctimas mismas del terremoto, quienes tendrán el papel principal en el restablecimiento de su propia autosuficiencia económica.

Este proyecto ayudará a revertir una tendencia que sucede desde hace décadas, de éxodo masivo del campo haitiano hacia los tugurios precarios de la capital. El resultado final será un gran fortalecimiento de la base económica de Haití, una revitalización del campo, y un Puerto Príncipe menos hacinado y mejor planificado.

Descripción detallada del proyecto

• Los pueblos (representados por el gobierno municipal, asociaciones de campesinos, iglesias, etc.) aceptarán familias desplazadas de Puerto Príncipe y otras áreas golpeadas por el terremoto. El pueblo cederá terrenos que no estén en uso a estas familias (media hectárea por familia), y todo el pueblo colaborará en días de campo para rehabilitar la tierra en estas parcelas (trazando trincheras anti-erosivas, plantando líneas de árboles y plantas para retener la tierra, etc.). Normalmente esta tierra sin usar se ha abandonado porque está muy degradada. Dársela a una familia para cuidar y que se ganen la vida de la tierra es una manera para asegurar que se regenere, pero primero tiene que recibir una atención intensiva de todo el pueblo para hacerla utilizable. El proceso de rehabilitación de la tierra lo pueden supervisar agrónomos haitianos, y si es necesario agrónomos de otros países y ONGs pueden ofrecer sus servicios también. Por ejemplo, Cuba tiene una amplia experiencia de “prestar” agrónomos a pueblos haitianos remotos.

• A cambio de su colaboración en ceder y acondicionar tierra para las víctimas del terremoto, el pueblo recibirá un conjunto de inversiones en infraestructura y del bien común, implementadas por ONGs y el gobierno haitiano. Estas intervenciones pueden incluir la excavación de pozos públicos de agua potable, la construcción o la mejora de la escuela local, o la instalación de letrinas públicas, entre otros. También sería deseable reclutar la ayuda del Earth Institute de Columbia University, con su proyecto de Aldeas del Milenio. Pueden proveer su conjunto probado de mejoras de carretera, un camión comunal para el uso del pueblo, insumos agrícolas como fertilizantes, clínicas médicas, mosquiteras tratadas, etc.

• Si no han participado en el conjunto de intervenciones más o menos estandarizadas que están expuestas arriba, los gobiernos haitianos locales y nacional pueden implementar un proyecto prioritario decidido por el pueblo como una biblioteca o una cancha de fútbol. Es importante reforzar la confianza y la interacción de la gente con su gobierno.

• La meta eventual es que los supervivientes del terremoto construyan sus propias casas en los terrenos que el pueblo les haya cedido. Sin embargo, mientras se construye esta casa, varios complejos familiares del pueblo recibirán cada uno a una familia de supervivientes del terremoto. Se integrará la familia de supervivientes al hogar de la familia anfitriona (preferiblemente parientes de los supervivientes).

• A cambio de esta contribución al bienestar de las víctimas del terremoto, los complejos familiares anfitriones recibirán una asesoría y un reacondicionamiento para poner sus casas a prueba de terremotos y huracanes, además de una letrina, y un préstamo de $500US de un banco de microcrédito, para invertir en un proyecto agrícola. La asesoría la haría inicialmente un equipo de expertos colombianos en construcción. Debido a un terremoto severo en 1999 en el centro-oeste de Colombia, el país posee muchos ingenieros con experiencia en situaciones pos-terremoto, y en la construcción de casas sismoresistentes con materias locales y baratas como el bambú. Una ONG especializada en saneamiento puede construir las letrinas. Los préstamos de microcrédito vendrían de Fonkoze, el banco de microcrédito más importante en Haití. El gobierno respaldará los préstamos a través de garantías. Fonkoze, como muchos otros bancos de microcrédito en el mundo en desarrollo, normalmente se enfoca en préstamos de poco monto y de corto plazo para actividades comerciales como la venta de comida procesada. Este banco necesitará un apoyo adicional para poder asumir el riesgo inherente en préstamos agrícolas más grandes.

• Las familias desplazadas recibirán una subvención y ayuda en especie para construir sus casas. Se dará prioridad a las materias naturales y localmente disponibles, y por supuesto las casas tendrán un diseño a prueba de terremotos y huracanes. Las grandes agencias donantes y el gobierno pueden proveer las subvenciones de vivienda, y Habitat for Humanity e ingenieros colombianos expertos en construcción sismoresistente pueden proveer ayuda directa en el diseño y la construcción de la casa.

• Las familias desplazadas también recibirán un préstamo agrícola de $500US. Estos préstamos se harán a grupos de 6 familias, en los que cada familia recibirá $500US. El grupo debe consistir en tres familias desplazadas, y tres familias anfitrionas del pueblo. Primero las tres familias desplazadas del grupo recibirán sus préstamos, con un periodo de gracia sin interés de 6 meses. Después de seis meses de sus pagos regulares de reembolso (o sea, un año después del desembolso inicial del préstamo), las otras tres familias recibirán sus préstamos, con el mismo periodo de 6 meses sin interés. Esto anima a todos los involucrados a colaborar, porque el crédito de todos depende de los pagos de reembolso de todos. Las prestatarias deben ser todas mujeres, porque tienen mejores tasas de repago que los hombres, y al enfocar el préstamo en ellas se mejorará su posición económica en la familia. Los préstamos se usarán para comprar insumos y equipos para un plan agrícola diversificado redactado por la prestataria, en colaboración con un agrónomo (preferiblemente haitiano) que evaluará la viabilidad ecológica y económica de la propuesta. Además de este préstamo, cada familia desplazada (pero no las familias anfitrionas) recibirá ganado donado (posiblemente de Heifer International), como cerdos, cabras, y gallinas, que proveen productos nutritivos que la familia puede consumir o vender, y que al mismo tiempo mejoran la fertilidad del suelo con su estiércol. Las semillas para proyectos agrícolas las pueden donar los centros CGIAR, que son conocidos por sus variedades de cultivos que producen bien bajo condiciones ambientales difíciles.

• Los contactos necesarios para implementar este proyecto son de gran alcance. Los socios iniciales en Haití rural pueden ser asociaciones campesinas como APF en Fondwa o MPP en Papaye. Para la identificación y la selección de víctimas urbanas del terremoto que quieren reubicarse, se puede trabajar con grupos de barrio como el de Bel Air, Puerto Príncipe, y con grupos comunitarios que surjan en campamentos de personas desplazadas. He mencionado unos posibles colaboradores entre ONGs internacionales, pero si se expandiera el proyecto a muchos pueblos sería preferible que estas ONGs encontraran o entrenaran haitianos locales para hacer el trabajo de excavar pozos, asesorar casas, dar consejos agrícolas, etc. Ya hay muchas víctimas urbanas del terremoto que ahora están viviendo en áreas rurales, lo que hace más fácil el proyecto porque ya se ha empezado. Idealmente sería posible confirmar que todas las personas que beneficien del proyecto de reubicación apoyada son de verdad víctimas del terremoto. Se podría hacer a través de un registro centralizado de víctimas (si el gobierno o la ONU crea este registro en el futuro), o verificando las tarjetas de identidad u otros documentos para establecer la residencia anterior en Puerto Príncipe u otras áreas afectadas.

• Puede realizarse una experiencia piloto del proyecto de apoyo a la migración de víctimas del terremoto en una sección comunal rural de más o menos 8000 personas. Si una zona así recibiera 500 familias (aproximadamente 2000 personas) de Puerto Príncipe, esto aumentaría la población local en un 25%, de 8000 a 10000. Una estimación generosa del costo de este proyecto sería $5000US por familia desplazada, asumido entre ONGs, el gobierno haitiano, y donantes internacionales. Es importante acordarse que este costo serviría para reubicar una familia, asegurar su sustento, y mejorar la vivienda, el saneamiento, y la vida económica de esos complejos familiares que reciban temporalmente a víctimas, además del pueblo en general. Así que costaría $2.5M US para reubicar más o menos 2000 personas y radicalmente mejorar la vida para 8000 más personas rurales, muchas de las cuales también estarían recuperando de algún grado de daño del terremoto. Una base para comparar es la estimación de Habitat for Humanity que costaría $2500US por familia sólo para construir vivienda temporal. Considerando todo esto, el costo de nuestra propuesta es muy modesto.

• Si la experiencia piloto tiene éxito, se puede ampliar a otros pueblos para convertirse en programa nacional. Repetir este proceso de migración apoyada en 250 pueblos reubicaría casi un cuarto de la población pre-terremoto de Puerto Príncipe, costaría $500M US, y traería desarrollo e infraestructura a casi la mitad de las comunidades rurales en Haití. Esto sería un complemento eficaz a lo que seguramente va a ser un esfuerzo masivo de reconstrucción y ayuda para esas personas que quieran quedarse en Puerto Príncipe. Nuestro proyecto aliviaría una parte de la presión poblacional de la ciudad, y crearía un campo revitalizado económicamente, que puede servir como abastecedor y como comprador de bienes y servicios en la capital. El efecto neto sería una armonización de la relación entre la capital y las provincias, y un crecimiento nacional basado en fundamentos agrarios sólidos. Todo esto por lo que seguramente será una fracción del precio del resto de la respuesta humanitaria en Haití.

Yon rekiperasyon ekonomik pou Ayiti, baze sou yon migrasyon pou viktim tranbleman ki sòti gran vil yo pou rive nan zòn riral yo

Kontèks ak rezime

Anpil viktim tranbleman resan nan Ayiti ap sòti Pòtoprens ak lòt vil pou ale vilaj natal yo nan zòn riral. Yon migrasyon konsa founi viktim-yo ak yon antouraj familyè pou sipòte yo pandan yo rekonstwi vi-yo, epi li redwi bezwen-an pou pwoje chè tankou rekonstriksyon vil-yo ak kanpman pou moun deplase. Pou tout sa, yon pati resous instititsyon ak ONG yo dwè ale pou sipòte migrasyon-sa-a vè zòn riral yo. Sipò-sa-a ta genyen eleman-sa-yo:

• Relye gwoupman peyizan ak fanmi riral ak gwoupman ak endividi nan lavil oubyen nan kanpman moun deplase

• Rekonpanse vilaj-yo ak lakou-yo ki resevwa viktim tranbleman, ak envestisman nan enfrastikti ak byennèt komen

• Pwomouvwa oto-sifizans ekonomik pou viktim tranbleman relokalize yo, ak teren, sibvansyon, ak prèt pou konstwi lojman ak fè aktivite agrikòl

Yon pwoje konsa ta bezwen yon kolaborasyon ant gouvènman ayisyen lokal e nasyonal (pou kòdinasyon ak kèk investisman nan enfrastrikti), bank ayisyen mikwokredi ak komèsyal, ajans devlopman ak ONG etranje (pou sibvansyon ak lòt investisman enfrastrikti), ak endividi ak kominote ayisyen, ki ta resevwa moun deplase epi bay teren pou jaden-w-yo. Moun pi enpòtan yo se viktim-menm-yo, ki ta jwe wòl prensipal la nan retablisman oto-sifizans ekonomik pou tèt-yo.

Pwoje-sa-a ta ede pou ranvèse yon tandans ki pase depi 50 an: migrasyon masiv la moun ki sòti zòn riral yo pou ale viv nan bidonvil Pòtoprens yo. Rezilta final pwoje a se yon ranfòsman pou baz ekonomik Ayiti a, yon revitalizasyon pou zòn riral yo, ak yon Pòtoprens ki gen mwens moun men ki planifye pi bon.

Deskripsyon detaye pwoje a

• Vilaj-yo (represante pa gouvènman minisipal, gwoupman peyizan, legliz, etc.) ta aksepte fanmi deplase ki sòti Pòtoprens ak lòt vil afekte pa tranbleman. Vilaj-la ta bay fanmi-sa-yo teren kominal ki pa itilize (yon demi-hekta pa fanmi), epi tout moun nan vilaj ta travay ansanm kèk jou pou reabilite tè-a sou teren-sa-yo (fouye fos anti-ewozyon, plante liy pyebwa ak zèb pou kenbe tè, etc.). Nòmalman moun-yo te abandone teren-sa-yo paske yo degrade anpil. Bay teren-an pou yon fanmi, pou yo okipe yo ave l pou genyen vi-yo, se yon fason pou asire tè a pral rejenere l, men premye fòk bay tè-a yon atansyon entansif pou fanmi-yo ka itilize l. Agwonòm ayisyen ka jere pwosesis rejenerasyon tè-a, epi si se nesesè kèk agwonòm etranje ak ONG ka ede ak pwosesis-la tou. Pa egzanp, Kiba gen anpil eksperyans pou “prete” agwonòm-pa-yo pou vilaj ayisyen.

• Nan retou pou kolaborasyon-li pou bay teren epi rekondisyone tè-a pou viktim tranbleman tè yo, vilaj-la ta resevwa yon seri entèvansyon pou enfrastrikti ak byennèt komen, aplike pa ONG ak gouvènman ayisyen an. Pa egzanp, yo ka fouye yon pwen dlo potab, yo ka konstwi ou amelyore lekòl vilaj la, oubyen yo ka enstale twalèt piblik pou vilaj-la. Li ta swetab tou kontakte Earth Institute nan linivèsite Columbia, ki gen yon pwoje ki rele Millenium Villages. Yo ka aplike entèvansyon tipik pa yo: amelyore wout-yo, bay yon kamyon minisipal pou bezwen vilaj yo, bay moustikyè trete, etabli yon klinik, founi entran agrikòl yo tankou angre, etc.

• Si yo pa patisipe nan entèvansyon standa yo ki ekri anwò, gouvènman ayisyen ak lokal yo ka akonpli yon pwoje prioritè deside pa vilaj-la, tankou yon chan futbòl oubyen yon bibliotèk. Se enpòtan ranfòse konfyans-nan ak enteraksyon-an pèp-la genyen ak gouvènman-an.

• Objektif final se pou sivivan tranbleman yo ka konstwi kay-yo sou teren vilaj bay yo. Men an atandan, divès lakou nan vilaj ta aksepte yon fanmi sivivan tranbleman an. Lakou ki resevwa yo ta entegre fanmi-a nan lakay. Pou chak lakou ki resevwa viktim tranbleman, se pi bon si yo fanmi pa alyans ak viktim yo resevwa, men yo ka resevwa moun yo pa konnen tou.

• Nan retou pou kontribisyon nan byennèt viktim yo, lakou-yo ki resevwa viktim tranbleman ta resevwa yon evalyasyon ak yon readaptasyon pou kay-yo pou li ka reziste lòt tranbleman ak siklón. Chak lakou ki resevwa viktim ta resevwa tou yon twalèt, ak yon prèt mikwokredi pou $500US ($3500ayisyen) pou yon pwoje agrikòl. Pou fè evalyasyon ka genyen yon ekip ekspè konstriksyon ki sòti Kolonbi. Enjennyè kolonbyen yo gen anpil eksperyans ak tranbleman tè yo, pou sa-a yo konnen konstwi kay ak materyo lokal tankou banbou, ki reziste tranbleman. Yon ONG ki spesialize nan lapwoptè ka konstwi twalèt-yo. Fonkoze ka founi prèt mikwokredi, paske li bank mikwokredi pi enpòtan an nan Ayiti. Gouvènman-an dwè bay yon garanti pou prèt-sa-yo. Fonkoze konn bay prèt pou enpe lajan, pou pwoje kout tèm tankou entrepriz komèsyal. Li ta bezwen yon sipò adisyonèl pou kapab jere risk-la ki gen andedan prèt agrikòl pi gwo.

• Chak fanmi deplase ta resevwa yon sibvansyon ak èd pou konstwi lakay nouvo yo. Priorite-a se konstwi ak materyo natirèl ki disponib lokalman, selon yon plan ki reziste tranbleman-yo. Gran ajans imanitè-yo ak gouvènman ayisyen an ta founi sibvansyon-yo, epi ekspè kolombyen yo ak Habitat for Humanity ka travay ak fanmi viktim yo pou planifye ak konstwi lakay-yo.

• Fanmi deplase yo ta resevwa tou yon prèt agrikòl pou $500US ($3500ayisyen). Fonkoze (petèt ak lòt bank komèsyèl), ta bay prèt-sa-yo pou gwoupman 6 fanmi, $500US chak fanmi. Gwoupman-an dwè genyen 3 fanmi deplase, ak 3 fanmi nan vilaj ki resevwa moun deplase. Premye fanmi deplase yo ta resevwa prèt-pa-yo, ak yon period 6 mwa san entere. Apre yo ranbouse pandan 6 mwa (sa vle di youn anne apre prèt inisyal), lòt 3 fanmi ta resevwa prèt-pa-yo, ak menm period 6 mwa san entere. Sa-a ankouraje tout fanmi pou kolabore, paske kredi tout moun depann sou ranbousman lòt fanmi yo. Se fanm nan chak fanmi ki ta resevwa lajan, paske yo ranbouse pi bon pase mari, epi si se fanm-yo ki kontwole lajan-an, sa-a amelyore pozisyon-yo nan fanmi-a. Yo dwè itilize prèt-yo pou achte entran ak ekipman pou akonpli yon plan agrikòl divèsifye. Moun ki resevwa prèt ta fè plan-sa-a ak yon agwonòm (pito yon agwonòm ayisyen) ki ta evalye vyabilite ekonomik ak ekolojik plan-an. An plis, chak fanmi deplase (men pa fanmi vilaj yo) ta resevwa bèt tankou kochon, kabrit, ak poul, ki founi fanmi-a ak pwodwi nitritif yo ka vann ou manje, epi an menm tan bèt-yo amelyore fètilite sòl-la ak fimye-a. Heifer International ka founi bèt-yo, epi sant CGIAR yo ka founi semans ki donnen byen menm nan kondisyon ekologik difisil.

• Fòk fè anpil koperasyon pou adopte pwoje-sa-a. Pou patnè ayisyen riral yo, nou ka travay ak gwoupman peyizan tankou APF nan Fondwa ou MPP nan Papaye. Tandiske pou idantifye ak seleksyonne viktim tranbleman nan vil-yo ki vle patisipe nan pwoje-a, nou ka travay ak gwoupman nan katye tankou Lonè ak Respè pou Bel Air, epi ak gwoupman kap fòme yo nan kanpman pou moun deplase. Mwen mansyone deja kèk kolaboratè posib ant ONG entènasyonal, men si nou te etann pwoje-a nan anpil vilaj, li ta pi bon si ONG-sa-yo ta jwenn epi ansenyen ayisyen lokal pou fè travay-yo pou fouye pwen dlo, pou evalye lakay, pou bay konsey agrikòl, etc. Deja gen anpil viktim tranbleman ki te sòti vil-yo pou viv nan zòn riral. Sa fè pwoje pi fasil pou fè paske li deja kòmanse. Idealman li ta posib konfime tout moun kap benifisye nan pwoje-sa-a se vreman viktim tranbleman yo ye. Nou ka verifye sa-a ak yon rejis viktim yo (si gouvènman oubyen ONU a te fè yon rejis konsa), oubyen nou ka tcheke kat didantite oubyen lòt dokiman pou verifye moun-yo te rete Pòtoprens ou lòt vil afekte pa tranbleman.

• Pwoje-sa-a pou sipòte migrasyon pou viktim tranbleman, nou ka eseye l premye nan yon seksyon kominal riral ak apèpre 8000 moun. Si yon zòn konsa te resevwa 500 fanmi (apèpre 2000 moun) ki sòti Pòtoprens, sa ta ogmante popilasyon-an 25%, pou genyen 10000 moun olye 8000 nan seksyon-an. Yon estimasyon jenere pou pwoje-sa-a se yon kout $5000US ($35000ayisyen) pa fanmi deplase. Gouvènman ayisyen an, ONG etranje, ak ajans entènasyonal ta pataje kout-sa-a. Se enpòtan sonje kout-sa-a ta sifizan pou relokalize yon fanmi, asire mwayen ekonomik li, ak amelyore lojman, lapwoptè, ak mwayen ekonomik pou lakou-a ki resevwa tanporalman fanmi-sa-a, epi amelyore kondisyon enfrastrikti pou vilaj an jeneral. Donk li ta koute $2.5M US ($17.5M ayisyen) pou relokalize 2000 moun epi amelyore radikalman lavi pou 8000 moun riral (anpil moun riral-sa-yo viktim tranbleman tou). Yon baz pou konpare kout-la se estimasyon Habitat for Humanity te fè. Yo bay yon kout $2500US ($17500ayisyen) pa fanmi, sèlman pou konstwi yon lojman tanporè. Lè nou konsidere sa-a, kout-la pou pwoje-pa-nou pa chè ditou.

• Si pwoje pilot la te reyisi nan yon vilaj, nou ta kapab etann li vè lòt vilaj pou fè li yon pwogram nasyonal. Repete pwosesis migrasyon sipòte a nan 250 vilaj ta relokalize preske katriyèm pati popilasyon Pòtoprens nan, li ta koute $500M US ($3500M ayisyen), epi li ta pòte devlopman ak enfrastrikti pou preske mwatye a kominote riral yo nan Ayiti. Sa-a ta konplimante pwoje-yo ajans entènasyonal ak gouvènman Ayiti a pral fè pou rekonstriksyon ak èd pou popilasyon-an kap rete Pòtoprens. Pwoje-nou ta atènye presyon popilasyon nan vil-la, epi li ta kreye yon peyisaj riral revitalize ki ka sèvi tankou founisè ak achtè pwodwi ak sèvis nan kapital-la. Rezilta final se yon amonizasyon pou relasyon ki gen ant kapital-la ak pwovans-yo, epi yon kwasans ekonomik nasyonal baze sou yon fondman solid agrè. Epi tout sa-a pral koute anpil mwens ke pri total rès repons ijans nan Ayiti.

An introduction

My name is Greg, and I live in Colombia, South America. I am trained as an agronomist, and this website will mainly be devoted to advancing ideas of agrarian reform in order to create a more just world with less hunger. It may seem at times that I propose more or less the same solution for everything, from obesity in the US, to aiding victims of the Haitian earthquake, to preventing Amazon deforestation. This is because I believe that many problems have their roots in the world's unequal distribution of land and capital resources.

Many of my first posts will be re-postings of things I've already written and either kept to myself or published on my Facebook page. Often I will post the same document in multiple languages, to make it more accessible to non-English speakers.